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ANTITRUST LAW-Development of the Defense 
of Sovereign Compulsion 
Recent decades have witnessed a remarkable and continuing 
expansion of American business abroad. This expansion has gener-
ally been viewed as desirable and in accord with American national 
interests and economic policies. However, such expansion has had the 
drawback of exposing American businesses to the demands of the 
various economic laws, policies, and customs of the countries into 
which they have moved. American courts have consistently held that 
an American business operating abroad is subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States antitrust laws when the activities of the business 
substantially affect interstate or foreign commerce.1 This extraterri-
torial application of the federal antitrust laws has confronted busi-
nessmen doing business abroad with conflicts between American law 
and the law of the foreign country in which they are operating. 
One of the most troublesome of these conflicts arises when an 
American business abroad is subjected to an order of a foreign gov-
ernment and the carrying out of that order requires that business to 
violate the antitrust laws of the United States. The recent case of 
Interamerican Refining Corporation v. Texaco Maracaibo, In-
corporated2 confronted an American court with this precise issue 
for the first time.3 The United States District Court for the District 
of Delaware responded by saying that the defendants had been com-
pelled to act as they did by the orders of a foreign sovereign govern-
ment, 4 and it held that such "sovereign compulsion," when proved, 
I. The Supreme Court, in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp., 
370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962), citing prior decisions going back to United States v. American 
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (19ll), held that the antitrust jurisdiction of the United 
States federal courts extended to a conspiracy to restrain the foreign or domestic 
commerce of the United States even though the conduct complained of occurred in a 
foreign country. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 
(2d Cir. 1945), in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that even a 
foreign company acting in a foreign country was subject to United States antitrust 
laws if its activities substantially affected American commerce and if such effects were 
intended by that foreign company. 
2. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del, 1970). 
3. There was no jurisdiction question in the Interamerican case. All parties were 
American corporations, and, while the activity complained of by the plaintiff took 
place partly in Venezuela, the agreement and subsequent conduct of the defendants 
affected American foreign commerce. As a result, the question of jurisdiction fell 
squarely within the language of the Supreme Court in Continental Ore Co. v. 
Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962), discussed in note I supra. 
This Note will assume that jurisdiction is present whenever the applicability of the 
defense of sovereign compulsion is under discussion. 
4. 307 F. Supp. at 1296. 
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constitutes a complete defense to an antitrust action.5 It is the pur-
pose of this Note to explore this newly promulgated doctrine of 
sovereign compulsion in order to determine the basis on which it is 
founded and the practical difficulties and consequences that may re-
sult from its application. 
l. THE INTERAMERICAN DECISION 
A. Background 
The plaintiffs in Interamerican brought an action under the 
Sherman6 and Clayton7 Acts, alleging that the defendants had en-
gaged in a "concerted boycott designed to deny Interamerican 
Venezuelan crude oil required for its operations."8 Interamerican 
was an American corporation engaged in the business of processing 
Venezuelan crude oil at its bonded refinery in Bayonne, New 
Jersey.9 The principal stockholders of Interamerican were Venezue-
lan nationals, two of whom were personae non gratae to the present 
Venezuelan Government. 
Defendants Texaco Maracaibo, Incorporated (Supven)10 and 
Monsanto Venezuela, Incorporated (Monven)11 held concessions 
from the Venezuelan Government for the production of crude oil. 
In the course of their operations, they supplied crude oil to defen-
dant Amoco Trading Company, an American company that was not 
actually operating within Venezuela.12 Interamerican contracted to 
obtain its crude oil through Amoco and thereafter received three 
shipments.13 
5. 307 F. Supp. at 1296. 
6. Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or othenvise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ••• " (emphasis added). 
7. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in 
part: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold 
the damages by him sustained •••• " 
8. !107 F. Supp. at 1292. 
9. Interamerican planned to place its refined oil on the market at a low price by 
processing it in a bonded refinery and then exporting it or selling it as ship's bunker 
-fuel oil that the ship uses itself-in New York harbor, thereby avoiding United States 
import quota and tariff restrictions. 307 F. Supp. at 1292. 
10. Texaco Maracaibo was formerly the Superior Oil Company of Venezuela 
(Supven). 
11. Monsanto Venezuela, Inc. (Monven) was a wholly owned subsidiary of defen-
dant Monsanto Company. 
12. As a trading company, Amoco was the middle man between refineries and 
producers of crude oil in Venezuela and other countries. In the instant case, Amoco 
loaded the crude oil produced by Supven and Monven into its tankers at Venezuelan 
ports and then shipped it to Interamerican. 
13. The first shipment originated with Monven, the last two with Supven. 
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Foreign oil concerns doing business in Venezuela hold their con-
cessions subject to regulation by the government's Ministry Gf Mines 
and Hydrocarbons. This ministry supervises and reviews the sales 
policies of concessionaries and promulgates rules governing the sale 
of oil produced in Venezuela.14 Among the sanctions imposed for 
violating these rules is the suspension of the right to ship oil out of 
Venezuela.lli Pursuant to this authority, after the first shipments to 
Interamerican, Supven and Monven were called before the Ministry 
and were instructed that no more Venezuelan oil was to reach Inter-
american. The reasons behind these instructions were mixed. They 
apparently stemmed partly from the personal animosity that certain 
high Venezuelan Government officials felt toward the chief share-
holders of Interamerican16 and partly from an attempt by the 
ministry to effectuate certain Venezuelan economic policy objec-
tives.17 
After receipt of these instructions, Amoco informed Interameri-
can that it could no longer supply it with Venezuelan crude oil, since 
the Venezuelan Government had forbidden either direct or indirect 
sales to Interamerican. In fact, all of the defendants refused to sell 
Venezuelan crude to Interamerican unless the Venezuelan Govern-
ment would lift the ban. As a result of these refusals to deal, Inter-
american brought a treble-damage action under section 4 of the 
Clayton antitrust law18 claiming that defendants were engaging in 
an unlawful concerted refusal to deal.19 
B. Prior Cases 
The defendants did not deny the charge that they had concertedly 
refused to deal with Interamerican. Rather, they argued that foreign 
governmental compulsion is a complete defense to an antitrust action 
based on such a charge.2° Chief Judge Caleb Wright of the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware agreed. Finding 
that the defendants had been compelled to engage in a concerted 
refusal to deal by the Venezuelan Government, he held that "a 
14. 307 F. Supp. at 1294. 
15. 307 F. Supp. at 1294. 
16. 307 F. Supp. at 1295-96. See text following note 9 supra. 
17. The two principal economic policy objectives of the Venezuelan Government 
appeared to be a desire to keep Venezuelan crude oil from going to "unnatural" markets 
such as Canada and Europe, and a fear of allowing crude oil to go to a bonded 
refinery, such as Interamerican's, because of the low price at which such oil could be 
sold on the international market. 307 F. Supp. at 1294-95. 
18. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). See note 7 supra. 
19. A concerted refusal to deal occurs when a group of traders agree to boycott-
not deal with-another trader. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 
U.S. 207! 212 (1959). 
20. Joint Brief for Defendants at 50-52, Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco 
Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). 
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showing of bona fide compulsion by a foreign government im-
munizes an otherwise illegal boycott."21 
As Chief Judge Wright acknowledged, Interamerican presented a 
case of first impression. There is no statutory authority providing 
for the defense of sovereign compulsion, and there are no prior re-
ported American cases specifically holding that the defense is an 
appropriate one. The court did, however, find relevant dicta in the 
cases of Continental Ore Company v. Union Carbide & Carbon Cor-
poration22 and United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Informa-
tion Center, Incorporated (Swiss Watch).23 
The Continental Ore case involved a charge that Union Carbide 
had conspired with one of its subsidiaries, Electro Metallurgical 
Company of Canada, Ltd. (Electro Met), to monopolize vanadium 
production and sales in Canada.24 Electro Met had been appointed 
by the Canadian Government to be its exclusive purchasing agent of 
vanadium. The United States Supreme Court, per Justice White, 
held that Electro Met was not excused from refusing to deal with 
Continental Ore, an American corporation that sold vanadium, 
simply because it was "acting in a manner permitted by Canadian 
law."25 The Court, however, seemed to qualify its holding by observ-
ing that there was "no indication that the Controller or any other 
[Canadian] official ... directed that purchases from Continental be 
stopped."26 Commentators have read this statement as implying that 
if the Canadian Government actually had made such a direction, the 
Court would have reached a different result.27 
In the Swiss Watch case, Swiss and American makers and sellers 
of watches and watch parts were charged with a conspiracy to restrain 
United States commerce in watches.28 The heart of the conspiracy 
was the Collective Convention, a private agreement among associa-
tions of Swiss manufacturers and some individual American manufac-
turers. One of the designs of the Convention was to regulate the flow 
of Swiss watch parts to American watchmakers with the intended 
purpose of suppressing the American watch industry. The District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found that this in-
21. 307 F. Supp. at 1297 n.14. 
22. 370 U.S. 690 (1962). See note I supra. 
23. 1963 Trade Cas. 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
24. Vanadium is a rare metal used in producing vanadium steel-a tough and 
durable steel. 
25. 370 U.S. at 706-07. 
26. 370 U.S. at 706. 
27. See, e.g., Barnard, Extra-Territoriality and Anti-Trust Law in the United 
States, 6 SUPP. INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 95, 104 (1963); Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA. L. REv. 925, 934 (1962); Graziano, Foreign Governmental 
Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INTL. L. 100, 136-37 
(1967). 
28. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,416. 
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tended purpose was in fact effectuated by the curtailment of watch 
parts exported from Switzerland to the United States.29 The court 
recognized that the Swiss watch industry was heavily regulated by the 
Swiss Government and that the Collective Convention was en-
couraged by that government. However, the court emphasized that 
participation in the Collective Convention was not required by 
Swiss law.30 As a result, the defendants were held liable for partici-
pating in the privately agreed-upon restrictive practices, even though 
such practices were permitted under Swiss law.31 Significantly, the 
opinion by Judge Cashin distinguished this case from the situation 
where a foreign government compels businesses to engage in 
activities that violate American antitrust laws: "If, of course, the 
defendant's activities had been required by Swiss law, this court 
could indeed do nothing. "32 
C. Justification for the Sovereign Compulsion Defense 
In the Interamerican case, Chief Judge Wright declined to base 
his holding that a sovereign compulsion defense was appropriately 
raised solely on the precedential authority of the dicta in these two 
earlier cases. He also emphasized that two basic policy concerns 
dictated recognizing this defense: fairness to the coerced businessman 
and intergovernmental comity. 
When an American business abroad is ordered by the foreign 
country in which it is operating to do an act that violates American 
antitrust laws, that business is confronted with a harsh dilemma. If 
it does not comply, it may well be forced to end its operations in the 
foreign country and thereby sustain great financial loss. On the other 
hand, if it does comply, it could be faced with a crippling treble-
damage action in an American federal court. The district court in 
Interamerican recognized the need for resolving such a dilemma. 
A desire to resolve the conflict appeared to be the motivating force 
behind the court's decision to adopt the concept of sovereign com-
pulsion.33 
29. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,424. 
30. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,426. Although adherence to the Convention was not re-
quired by the Swiss Government, that government played a very substantial role in 
the conduct of the Swiss watch industry. The great interest taken by the Swiss Govern-
ment in the industry and in this suit exemplifies the importance of conflicts that can 
arise between the United States antitrust system and foreign systems of government-
supported or government-compelled private regulation. For a thorough discussion of 
the Swiss Watch case, see 4 BUSINESS REGULATION IN THE COMMON MARKET NATIONS: 
CollrMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST ch. 6 a. Rahl ed. 1970) [hereinafter J. Rahl]. 
31. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,456. 
32. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,456. 
33. Chief Judge Wright, in his opinion, enunciated his concern in these terms: 
Commerce may exist at the will of the government, and to impose liability for 
obedience to that will would eliminate for many companies the ability to transact 
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As has been noted, this court was not the first to indicate concern 
for the plight of American businesses abroad that find themselves 
caught in conflicts between American antitrust law and the laws of 
foreign states. The Supreme Court in Continental Ore, as well as 
the district court in Swiss Watch, indicated in dicta that govern-
mental compulsion should immunize the business involved from 
antitrust liability.34 Similarly, American courts, in fashioning con-
sent decrees and other forms of equitable relief, have in a number 
of instances exhibited considerable caution in requiring extraterri-
torial compliance. In some cases, the courts have provided that the 
coerced party may be excused from compliance with decrees when 
such compliance would require contravention of a foreign country's 
law within that country's territory.35 Furthermore, in the procedural 
area of discovery, the Supreme Court has excused nonproduction of 
documents by a party to a suit when such documents are located in a 
foreign country and their production is barred by the laws of that 
country.36 Thus, the Interamerican court's policy objective of fairly 
business in foreign lands. ·were compulsion not a defense, American firms abroad 
faced with a government order would have to choose one country or the other 
in which to do business. The Sherman Act does not go so far. 
307 F, Supp. at 1298. 
34. See text accompanying notes 22-32 supra. 
35. See, e.g., United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 
74,203, 74:2,07 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (exception for "any act in a foreign nation in violation 
of any law • • • of said foreign nation''); United States v. United Fruit Co., 1958 
Trade Cas. 73,790, 73,801 (E.D. La. 1958) (exception "if such action is required by 
the Government of the country in which the act takes place''); United States v. Ameri-
can Smelting &: Ref. Co,, 1957 Trade Cas. 73,798, 73,402 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (exception for 
"any act in a foreign country • . • required of defendant • . . by the government 
thereof''); United States v. General Elec. Co., ll5 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953) 
(exception "for doing anything outside of the United States which is required • . . 
under the laws of the government .•. in which Philips . • . may be incorporated, 
chartered or organized or ... doing business''); United States v. Imperial Chem. 
Indus., Ltd., Civil No. 24-13 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1952) (Final Judgment), cited in Fugate, 
supra note 27, at 934 n.44, court's opinion at 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (exception 
to the injunction against the British defendant for acts "in compliance with any law 
of ••• any government or instrumentality thereof, to which ICI is at the time being 
subject, and concerning matters over which, under the laws of the United States, such 
foreign government has jurisdiction''). 
It should be noted that such deference by the courts has undergone a change in 
rationale. In the early cases, the courts felt that American law dictated that one nation 
could not order conduct to be carried on in another nation unless that conduct was 
legal in the other nation. See United States v. General Elec. Co., ll5 F. Supp. 835 
(D.N.J. 1953); R.EsrATEMENT OF CONFLicr OF LAws § 94 (1934). Recently, however, 
American authorities have adopted the view that American courts have the power to 
order conduct abroad even if it is illegal in the foreign country. See, e.g., R.EsrATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 39 (1965). Although the courts have recognized 
such power, they have refrained from employing it, in an attempt to avoid placing par-
ties in positions in which they must violate foreign laws. See Societe Internationale v. 
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). See generally J. Rahl, supra note 30, at 118-20. 
36. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). In this case, the Supreme 
Court held: "It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a 
weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws 
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treating businessmen caught between conflicting laws of. different 
sovereigns reflects a policy that has long been articulated and im-
plemented by the federal courts. 
In addition to this sound policy objective, the court in Inter-
american rested its decision on an ambiguously expressed desire to 
foster and maintain international comity. The opinion contains an 
undertone of concern that a judgment against the defendants could 
be construed as a judgment against the foreign sovereign. The court 
clearly wanted to avoid the potentially troublesome ramifications of 
such an interpretation. Accordingly, the court simply considered the 
acts of the defendants to be the acts of the foreign sovereign itself: 
It requires no precedent, however, to acknowledge that sover-
eignty includes the right to regulate commerce within the nation. 
When a nation compels a trade practice, firms then have no choice 
but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the sover-
eign.37 
Although Chief Judge Wright neglected, perhaps intentionally, to 
set forth the theoretical or doctrinal basis for this concept,38 the 
preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign." 357 U.S. at 211. The Court 
went on to hold that the petitioner was excused from compliance with the pretrial 
production order because the laws of Switzerland preventing disclosure made such 
compliance impossible. 
37. 307 F. Supp. at 1298. Many legal writers have accepted this concept of con-
sidering the acts of the companies involved as having effectively become those of the 
fon:ign government and have expressed the opinion that acts ordered by a foreign 
government should be exempt from enforcement of American antitrust laws. See 
ArroRNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. To STUDY nm ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 83 (1955) 
[hereinafter ATIORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]; K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN 
BUSINESS ABROAD 92-93 (1958); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST 
LAws 148 (1958); H. KRONSTEIN, J. MILLER & I. SCHWARTZ, MODERN AMERICAN ANTITRUST 
LAW 267 (1958); J. Rahl, supra note 30, at 238; Timberg, United States and Foreign 
Antitrust Laws Governing International Business Transactions, in A LAWYER'S GUIDE 
TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 619, 624 (Surrey & Shaw ed. 1963); Barnard, 
supra note 27, at 103; Celler, A Congressman's View of Foreign Commerce Aspects of 
the Sherman Act, 27 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 3 (1965); Graziano, supra note 27, at 116. 
38. To support the proposition that the acts of the defendants effectively become 
the acts of the foreign sovereign, some legal ·writers have cited the famous case of 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See W. FUGATE, supra 
note 37, at 148; J. Rahl, supra note 30, at 238. However, reliance upon American 
Banana to support a sovereign compulsion defense seems very questionable. 
The American Banana case involved the occupation of plaintiff's property in 
Panama by actual agents of the Costa Rican Government. The plaintiff had brought 
suit alleging defendant's liability for having instigated the occupation. Under these 
circumstances, and under a territorially based jurisdiction concept, the Supreme 
Court held that the defendant could not be held liable for acts actually carried out by 
a foreign government. 213 U.S. at 357-58. 
The jurisdiction concept of territoriality used by the Court in American Banana, 
which provides that acts done in a foreign country must be judged by the law of that 
foreign country, 213 U.S. at 356, although never expressly overruled, has been consis• 
tently overlooked by the Court in later decisions involving the extraterritorial applica-
tion of American antitrust laws. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & 
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equation of the corporations and the foreign government did provide 
one springboard for his decision to immunize the defendants' ac-
tivities. He reasoned that the compelled acts of the defendants 
are to be treated the same as if they had been acts of the foreign 
sovereign and that either (I) acts of foreign sovereigns are not 
within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act or (2) even if American 
courts do have jurisdiction, they cannot inquire into the validity or 
legality of the acts of the foreign sovereign.39 In order to support 
its proposition that the Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction 
over the acts of a foreign sovereign, the district court sought to 
analogize the sovereign compulsion question with the doctrine of 
Parker v. Brown.40 
The Parker case involved a program authorized by the California 
Agricultural Prorate Act,41 an act that provided for the adoption of 
joint marketing plans regulating the sale of raisins. Private pro-
ducers of raisins devised these plans, and the practical control actually 
exercised by the state was limited to a veto power occasionally 
utilized by the state Director of Agriculture. The Supreme 
Court agreed that the scheme resulted in restricted competition in 
the marketing of raisins.42 It was quite clear that had the producers 
agreed upon the scheme privately and had no state action been in-
volved, the marketing plans would have constituted a combination 
in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. However, the 
Supreme Court held that anticompetitive actions by private pro-
ducers that resulted from compliance with a state regulatory pro-
gram were not the subject of antitrust liability.43 The Court stated 
that "the Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and 
gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official 
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 
U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (19ll). 
Moreover, the American Banana opinion contains no language that would control 
the sovereign compulsion problem. The Court limited its decision to ruling upon acts 
actually carried out by the foreign sovereign and did not encompass the separable 
problem of acts compelled by the sovereign but carried out by private business. As a 
result, it would seem that the only continuing validity of American Banana is its 
availability to the Court as a building block should the Court decide to hold that 
American courts do not have jurisdiction over sovereign compulsion disputes. In so 
holding, however, the Court would need to revert to the territorial approach of juris• 
diction and somehow distinguish the sovereign compulsion situation from all other 
antitrust settings involved in cases decided since American Tobacco, which ignored the 
American Banana holding, that reject such an approach. Such a course by the Court 
seems at best unlikely. 
39. 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99. 
40. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). This case was noted by Chief Judge Wright at 307 F. Supp. 
at 1298 n.18. 
41. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, [1933] Statutes of California, as amended CAL, Acruc. 
CoDE § 59501 (West 1968). 
42. 317 U.S. at 352. 
43. 317 U.S. at 352. 
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action directed by a state. "44 The Court thought that in the absence 
of such mention congressional intent to interfere with the "sover-
eignty" of the state was not "lightly to be attributed."45 
Such a policy of solicitude for governmental sovereignty might 
be applied in the Interamerican context. But, although both Inter-
american and Parker v. Brown obviously involved the influence and 
effects of governmental action, the analogy between the two cases is 
othenvise forced. Parker v. Brown stands for the limited propo-
sition that a state government, which is a constituent part of the 
American federal scheme, enjoys immunity from the federal anti-
trust laws and that it may extend this immunity to companies 
operating under its established program.46 It is not at all the same to 
say that a foreign government, which is not subordinate to the Con-
stitution of the United States and which may harbor values alien to 
traditionally accepted American values, can similarly order the laws 
of the United States to be violated with impunity.47 As a result, 
although Parker v. Brown has certain factual similarities to Inter-
american, it is by no means sufficient authority in itself for the 
broad construction of the scope of the defense of sovereign com-
pulsion announced by the district court in Interamerican. 
Foreseeing the possible inapplicability of the Parker v. Brown 
doctrine, the court in Interamerican also asserted that even if it had 
jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign's acts, the act-of-state doctrine 
prevented it from inquiring into the legality of those acts.48 Al-
though an act-of-state situation does present striking similarities to 
a sovereign compulsion setting, it is questionable whether the act-of-
state doctrine provides controlling authority for the latter situation. 
The act-of-state doctrine can be traced to the case of Underhill v. 
44. 317 U.S. at 351. 
45. 317 U.S. at 351. 
46. 317 U.S. at 351-52. 
47. An analogous situation is present in the area of vertical resale price main-
tenance agreements. Such agreements are generally illegal per se under American 
antitrust laws. United States v. Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); AnoRNEY 
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 37, at 150. However, the McGuire Amendment of 1952, 
Act of July 14, 1952, ch, 745, § 2, 66 Stat. 631, adding §§ 5(a)(2)-(5) to the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2)-(5) (1964), provides some exemption for 
such agreements when they are legal under the "fair-trade" laws of any "State, 
Territory, or the District of Columbia." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1964). The question 
has been raised whether fair-trade laws passed by foreign governments would also 
enjoy immunity from the federal antitrust laws. It has been convincingly argued 
that Congress intended to allow only states in the United States to develop their 
own policies free from federal interference and that it did not intend to give such 
discretion to foreign governments. See J. Rahl, supra note 30, at 205-06. The same 
rationale is applicable to Parker v. Brown since Congress intended neither to control 
the activities of a state under the Sherman Act nor to give foreign nations complete 
discretion over the applicability of the Sherman Act to American foreign commerce. 
48. 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99. 
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Hernandez,49 in which Chief Justice Fuller explained the doctrine in 
the following terms: "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the 
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one 
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of 
another done within its own territory."50 This deference to the acts 
of foreign sovereign states is based upon a realization that the cause 
of international harmony would not be well served by subjecting the 
acts of a foreign sovereign to judicial scrutiny by American courts51 
and, concurrently, upon the proper separation of powers within the 
American federal government.52 Since Underhill, the courts have 
consistently refused to examine the legality or propriety of acts 
carried out by a foreign sovereign within its own territory.53 
As evidenced by the Interamerican court's willingness to invoke 
the act-of-state doctrine, the parallels are obvious between a situation 
such as that in Interamerican and that in which the doctrine is 
properly applied. But the act-of-state doctrine is not controlling in 
the Interamerican situation, principally because the sovereign com-
pulsion defense is not concerned with the validity or legality of the 
foreign government's order. Rather, its concern is centered upon 
determinations whether the American business was in fact ordered 
to act in a manner violative of American antitrust laws and whether 
it complied with that order. This concern is separate and distinct 
from the concern of the act-of-state doctrine since the sovereign 
compulsion defense does not involve an inquiry into the propriety of 
the foreign government's act. Thus, the basic equation adopted by 
the court in Interamerican that the acts of the defendants are the 
same as the acts of the foreign government does not require a grant 
of immunity from American antitrust laws for the defendants, and 
is in itself inappropriate to a sovereign compulsion question.54 
49. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
50. 168 U. S. at 252. For a general discussion of the act-of-state doctrine, see METZGER, 
Act of State Doctrine Refined: The Sabbatino Case, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 223; van 
Panhuys, In the Borderland Between the Act of State Doctrine and Questions of 
Jurisdictional Immunities, 13 INTL. &: COMP. L.Q. 1193 (1964); Zander, The Act of 
State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INTL. L. 826 (1959). 
51. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918), in which the 
Supreme Court stated that judicial review of another country's sovereign acts "would 
very certainly imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace 
of nations." 
52. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964), a case 
involving the expropriation of American property by the Cuban Government, the Su-
preme Court declared that the act-of-state doctrine "arises out of the basic relationships 
between branches of government in a system of separation of powers." The Court went 
on to express concern that judicial review of foreign acts might hinder the progress of 
American foreign policy. 
53. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). See also refer-
ences cited in note 50 supra. 
54. Another international-law doctrine that provides some parallel considerations 
with sovereign compulsion is that of sovereign immunity. This doctrine is essentially 
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Nevertheless, concepts of international comity do provide general 
policy objectives-such as judicial reluctance to interfere with inter-
nal affairs of foreign sovereigns and judicial deference to the execu-
a procedural concept protecting foreign states from suit in American courts. The origin 
of this doctrine is generally traced to the case of Schooner Exch. v. M'Fadden, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). That case involved a vessel expropriated by the French 
Government and converted into a warship. While docked at an American port, the 
ship was libeled by its former owners. The Attorney General, acting on behalf of the 
State Department, suggested to the Court that the ship be held immune from suit. 
The Court specifically recognized that it had territorial supremacy and jurisdiction, 
but it declined to adjudicate the merits of the case by holding that the warship was 
immune from suit: 
[O]ne sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by 
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by 
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can 
be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the 
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, 
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended 
to him. 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137. The overriding concern with maintaining amicable inter-
national relations can easily be seen in this formulation of the doctrine. But the 
doctrine is also based on the desire of American courts to defer to the executive 
branch of government for the conduct of foreign affairs. See, e.g., National City Bank 
v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361 (1955); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 
U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (in which the Court stated that the courts will follow whatever 
determination the executive makes concerning whether immunity should be applied); 
Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943). 
Official representatives and governmental agencies of foreign governments have 
been consistently recognized as integral parts of their governments and are thereby 
also eligible for immunity. See, e.g., National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 
356, 358 (1955). However, the availability of the doctrine of sovereign immunity for 
agents of foreign states has been considerably narrowed in the United States with the 
adoption by the State Department of the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity. 
This restrictive theory became the general policy of the State Department in 1952 
with the writing of what has been termed the Tate Letter. This letter stated in part: 
According to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity 
of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) 
of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis) . ... [I]t will here-
after be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of 
sovereign immunity. 
Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Dept. of State, May 19, 1952, in 
26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984, 985 (1952). 
Sovereign compulsion could be analogized to the sovereign immunity doctrine by 
considering the defendant to be effectively the agent of the foreign sovereign. How-
ever, although inquiry by an American court in a sovereign compulsion case could 
produce the same international friction that sovereign immunity was designed to 
prevent, principles of sovereign immunity do not control a sovereign compulsion 
question. In the first place, it is doubtful that the defendant's acts would qualify for 
the jure imperii requirement. But, more important, the action in a sovereign compul-
sion case is not against the foreign government, and the defendant cannot properly 
be considered its agent. To find such agency in the typical sovereign compulsion case 
would mean that every firm or individual that complies with a law or governmental 
order is an agent of the government. Such an assumption amounts to a shallow and 
unnecessary legal fiction. 
For a general discussion of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, see T. 
GIUTARRI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1970); Bishop, New United 
States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INTL. L. 93 (1953); Collins, The 
Effectiveness of the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 4 CoLUM. J. OF 
TRANSNATL. L. 119 (1965); Lauterpacht, Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign 
States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 220 (1951). 
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tive branch in matters of foreign affairs-that a court may properly 
consider in deciding whether to hold a business under sovereign 
compulsion liable for antitrust violations. Moreover, it has previ-
ously been observed that notions of fairness suggest that it is un-
duly harsh to penalize a firm under American law for complying 
with the laws of a foreign nation.55 Thus, the Interamerican court 
was probably correct in concluding that sovereign compulsion should 
be available as a defense-at least in some circumstances. The court's 
inability to articulate a clear theoretical foundation for the doctrine 
of sovereign compulsion may perhaps be excused by the doctrine's 
newness and uniqueness. 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE lNTERAMERICAN DOCTRINE 
Even if the sovereign compulsion defense is desirable from the 
standpoints of fairness and international comity, the question re-
mains whether the defense, as formulated in Interamerican, is con-
sistent with the basic policy objectives of the federal antitrust laws. 
The Sherman Act extends its guarantees of free competition, not 
merely to commerce among the several states, but to commerce with 
foreign nations as well.56 What, then, are the effects on free competi-
tion of the activity that the doctrine of the Interamerican case seems 
to encourage? 
A. Effects on American Policy 
Absent the defense of sovereign compulsion, the defendants 
undoubtedly were guilty of a per se violation of the Sherman Act 
by engaging in a concerted refusal to deal.57 The court, however, 
held that under the circumstances it would be unfair to subject the 
defendants to antitrust liability.58 Normally, courts do not engage 
in inquiries into the reasonableness of or possible justifications for 
per se offenses. As Justice Douglas wrote in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Company59 regarding another per se offense: 
Whatever economic justification particular price fixing agreements 
may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into 
55. See notes 33·36 supra and accompanying text. 
56. See note 6 supra. 
57. The same type of concerted refusal to deal found in the Interamerican case 
has consistently been held by the courts to be unreasonable per se and there• 
fore violative of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Radiant Burners v. People's Gas Light 
Be Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1960); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 
212 (1959); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941); Silver v. 
New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afjd., 373 U.S. 341, 347 
(1963). 
58. 307 F. Supp. at 1298. 
59. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
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their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual 
or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy.60 
This refusal to consider economic justifications has consistently been 
applied in other cases involving per se offenses, including concerted 
refusals to deal.61 The concerted refusal to deal involved in Inter-
american, however, was excused on the grounds of sovereign compul-
sion. Thus, whether or not one agrees with the seeming fairness of 
the result reached in Interamerican, it should be emphasized that 
the newly promulgated doctrine of sovereign compulsion provides 
an escape route from per se violations of the antitrust acts and there-
fore presents a potential for wide-ranging complications. 
A second problem revolves around the large amount of discretion 
that the court in Interamerican has vested in foreign governments: 
once a foreign government has acted, an American court is appar-
ently precluded from enforcing the antitrust laws. After the defen-
dant has shown that his conduct was ordered or directed by a foreign 
government, he need merely assert the defense of sovereign compul-
sion in order to escape antitrust liability. Such automatic termina-
tion of antitrust suits could easily have serious consequences on 
commerce and foreign affairs since the result would apparently be 
the same no matter how substantial the impact of the violation on 
either the commerce or the foreign policy of the United States. It 
may be questioned whether the Interamerican approach would be 
followed if the Italian Government were to order General Electric 
and Westinghouse to merge their Italian operations and fix prices 
as a condition to their doing business in Italy. Or, to suggest a more 
likely possibility, what if an Arab government were to direct all 
American businesses in its country to refuse to deal either directly or 
indirectly with Israeli- or Jewish-controlled firms? Under the Inter-
american approach, courts faced with situations such as these would 
have to determine whether the American businesses were actually 
compelled to act by the foreign governments involved. If so, a 
court would be barred from considering the matter further. 
A third and related problem under the Interamerican theory of 
sovereign compulsion is that the purposes of the foreign government 
in ordering a business to act in certain matters have no bearing on 
the question of liability for activities violative of American antitrust 
laws. In Interamerican, £or example, Venezuela was motivated both 
by a desire to keep its oil from going to a bonded refinery because of 
the low price at which such oil could be resold and a policy of 
preventing its oil from going to what it considered to be unnatural 
60. 310 U.S. at 224 n.59. 
61. The same policy of rejecting economic justifications for per se violations was 
applied to foreign commerce in the case of Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951). 
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markets such as Canada or Europe. 62 These factors indicated a policy 
on Venezuela's part to attempt to cartelize the international market 
for crude oil. Such a policy is totally inconsistent with the American 
policy against restraints on free competition. However, this policy 
conflict was not considered by the court in deciding whether the 
sovereign compulsion defense should be applied. By not permitting 
courts to consider the purposes behind a foreign sovereign's order, 
the Interamerican approach would apparently leave an American 
business free to participate in a foreign plan that is contrary to 
American policy and interests so long as the firm was ordered to do 
so by the foreign government involved. 
A fourth major problem raised by the Interamerican case is the 
question of the applicability of the sovereign compulsion defense to 
activities that are compelled by a foreign sovereign but carried on 
outside that sovereign's territory. Such a situation was presented in 
the Interamerican case. The Venezuelan Government ordered that 
all oil shipments to Interamerican, direct or indirect, be stopped. 
Amoco, a company that was not doing business in Venezuela, re-
sponded to this order and refused to deal with Interamerican. This 
company, as well as the companies actually doing business in 
Venezuela, was immunized from liability by the sovereign compul-
sion defense. 63 
As has been noted,64 Interamerican was a case of first impression, 
and there was no precedential or statutory basis for allowing the 
defense of sovereign compulsion. However, the problem had been 
anticipated by legal scholars,65 some of whom were cited in Chief 
Judge Wright's opinion.66 While these authorities support the basic 
concept of a defense of sovereign compulsion, all of them-unlike the 
district court in Interamerican-would limit such immunity to 
activities conducted within the foreign sovereign's territory.67 
It is uncertain what the Interamerican court's policy justification 
was for its broad application of the sovereign compulsion defense. 
It is, however, clear that by thus broadening the defense its poten-
tial for misuse was greatly expanded. Would it now be permissible 
for Ford and General Motors to merge their entire foreign divisions 
because the government of Nicaragua so ordered? Or would a 
62. See note 17 supra. 
63. 307 F. Supp. at 1304. 
64. See text preceding note 22 supra. 
65. Many legal writers have expressed the opinion that acts ordered by a foreign 
government should be exempted from the enforcement of American antitrust laws. 
See note 37 supra. 
66. 307 F. Supp. at 1298 nn.18, 19, citing ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 
37; K. BREWsrER, supra note 37; W. FUGATE, supra note 37; Fugate, supra note 27. 
67. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 37, at 83; w. FUGATE, supra 
note 37, at 148; Fugate, supra note 27, at 932. 
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Turkish order that instructed American tobacco buyers who pur-
chase tobacco in Turkey to refuse to purchase tobacco from Ameri-
can growers be recognized as a valid antitrust defense? The answers 
to these questions would apparently be in the affirmative since the 
only relevant concern of the Interamerican sovereign compulsion 
test is whether the foreign government actually ordered the activity 
involved. 
B. Effects on the Parties 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the very substantial costs 
to American foreign and economic policy that automatic deference 
to the demands of a foreign state may entail. The Interamerican 
formulation of the sovereign compulsion defense also has implica-
tions for the parties involved in antitrust suits. These implications 
revolve around statutory and judicial efforts to treat businesses 
fairly. 
It is disturbing to a sense of fairness to force a business to choose 
between discontinuing its trade in a foreign country and facing 
treble-damage antitrust liability at home.68 While American courts 
apparently had not directly considered the question of compulsion 
by a foreign sovereign in civil cases previous to Interamerican, simi-
lar considerations of fairness had been raised in the criminal setting 
in the treason cases that followed the Second World War. 
In the leading case in this area, Kawakita v. United States,60 the 
petitioner was both a natural-born citizen of the United States and 
a Japanese national by virtue of his parentage and of Japanese law. 
He had been prevented from returning to the United States after 
a visit to Japan by the outbreak of the war. During his forced stay, 
however, he demonstrated considerable sympathy with the Japanese 
cause through his work in a private corporation that produced war 
materials. During the course of this work, the petitioner apparently 
engaged in brutal abuse of American prisoners of war who were 
forced to labor at the factory where he was employed. Following the 
war, he reasserted his American citizenship and came back to the 
United States, where he was subsequently convicted of treason. In 
affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court was careful to point out 
that only acts done voluntarily or wilfully by the petitioner could be 
held treasonable.70 The Court stated that had the acts been "done 
under the compulsion of the job or the law or some other influence, 
those acts would not rise to the gravity of that offense."71 This 
68. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text. 
69. 343 U.S. 717 (1952). 
70. 343 U.S. at 735. 
71. 343 U.S. at 735. 
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distinction between compelled and voluntary acts had previously 
been recognized by the lower federal courts72 and in other common-
law jurisdictions.73 
An analogy can be drawn between criminal cases like Kawakita 
and the civil antitrust case involved in lnteramerican. Both situa-
tions involved acts committed abroad that contravened American 
law. The treason cases recognized that Americans should not be 
subjected to criminal punishment for compelled acts. The reasoning 
behind the dicta in those cases appears to have been that the defen-
dant could not have had the requisite intent to commit treason if he 
had been compelled to act and that it would be unfair to require 
so harsh a choice as death or treason.74 The sovereign compulsion 
defense in civil antitrust cases involves some similar policy considera-
tions. 
The analogy between treason and antitrust cases with regard to 
the sovereign compulsion defense is nevertheless imperfect in at 
least one important respect. The law of treason, like most criminal 
law, is principally designed to protect the interests of society as a 
whole.715 By saying that it is "fair" not to punish a defendant accused 
of treason, one is merely saying that the societal welfare does not 
require his punishment under the circumstances. However, different 
concerns are present in the ordinary civil action-in such actions it 
is clearly a goal of the law to compensate the victim for the harm he 
has suffered.76 Yet, it can be argued that the antitrust laws are at least 
somewhat analogous to criminal actions. The desire to protect the 
societal goal- of free competition,77 the punitive nature of treble dam-
ages, 78 and the occasional exercise of traditional criminal sanctions79 
all lend support to such an argument. But the antitrust laws also have 
strong characteristics of civil or private law since they create private 
causes of action.80 As a result, the individual victim of anticompetitive 
conduct, as well as society at large, has a broad right to protection 
against such activities. Thus, even if society is willing to sacrifice its 
72. See Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 974-76 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler 
v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 945 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). 
73. See, e.g., Rex v. Neumann, [1949] 3 S. AFR. L.R. 1238, 1268, 44 A.J. 423, 453. 
74. See generally Westbrook, The Mental Element as a Limitation on the Law 
of Treason, 68 DICK. L. R.Ev. I, 17 (1963). 
75. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 4 (1969); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS 7 (3d ed. 1964). 
76. W. PROSSER, supra note 75, at 7. 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 274 (1927). 
78. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 281 F.2d 481 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960), in which the court of appeals expressly 
characterized the treble-damage award as a "rigorous penalty.'' 
79. Criminal sanctions are provided for antitrust enforcement in § l of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1964). 
80. See note 7 supra. 
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general interest in free competition in order to treat American 
businesses abroad fairly, the victims of what would normally be 
unlawful activity under the antitrust laws may not be willing to 
forego their rights to redress. In other words, concepts of fairness 
toward businessmen facing conflicting laws of two sovereigns must 
be balanced against concepts of fairness toward victims of anticom-
petitive activity. 
III. A SUGGESTED FORMULATION FOR THE 
DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN COMPULSION 
The court in Interamerican was concerned with furthering two 
basic policy goals-intergovernmental comity and fairness to the 
coerced businessman. It has been suggested in this Note that the 
approach adopted by the court accepts intergovernmental comity at 
heavy expense to basic American interests. 81 It has also been sug-
gested that the abstract ideal of fairness will not always be served by 
holding the violator of the antitrust laws blameless.82 It is therefore 
submitted that in the area of sovereign compulsion, as in so many 
other areas of the law, the public welfare is not best served by the 
automatic application of a hard and fast rule. Rather, the courts 
should adopt a more flexible approach-one that aims at a just result 
by balancing the equities of the particular situation with which it is 
confronted. 
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations83 appears to 
advocate the adoption of such a balancing approach. Recognizing 
that under international law two sovereigns having concurrent juris-
diction over the same businessman may simultaneously subject him 
to conflicting demands,84 the Restatement suggests that each sover-
eign should weigh several factors before requiring compliance with 
its own law. Among the moderating factors suggested by the Restate-
ment are the national interests of each state, the nature of the 
hardship on the businessman, and the territorial impact of the re-
quired conduct. 85 Examination of such factors and others would 
81. See pt. II. A. supra. 
82. See pt. II. B. supra. 
83. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 40 (1965). See note 85 infra. 
84. It should be recognized that a determination of which sovereign should make 
demands upon a business when more than one sovereign has jurisdiction involves a 
discussion of principles of conflict of laws. See note 85 infra. However, this discussion 
of § 40 of the Restatement, which adopts a conflict-of-laws approach, will proceed 
no farther than an analogy to factors a court should review when considering a 
sovereign compulsion defense. The reason for this limitation is that the scope of 
this Note prevents a thorough discussion of the conflicts approach. For a general dis• 
cussion of the application of conflict-of-laws principles to extraterritorial enforcement 
of American antitrust law, see Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust 
Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE L.J. 259 (1960). 
85. The full text of the section provides: 
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introduce much-needed flexibility into the consideration of a 
claimed sovereign compulsion defense. 
The implementation of a balancing approach to the sovereign 
compulsion situation involves a marked divergence from the legal 
concepts normally applied by the courts in antitrust actions. Al-
though this divergence might seem "radical" at first glance, it is 
necessary to keep in mind the narrow and unique factual setting of 
a sovereign compulsion situation-that of a business abroad being 
compelled by a foreign government to engage in activities violative 
of American antitrust laws. 
This divergence from traditional analysis that is caused by the 
doctrine of sovereign compulsion involves the introduction of a new 
consideration into antitrust actions. Although the sovereign compul-
sion defense does not change or replace ordinary antitrust considera-
tions, it adds a new and independent question for the court to decide. 
Since the defense is intended to resolve both problems of interna-
tional comity and the dilemma facing businessmen abroad, the in-
quiry undertaken in order to ascertain whether it will apply 
will not be similar to the "rule of reason" inquiry of traditional anti-
trust law, which seeks to determine whether particular behavior in-
volves an unreasonable restraint of trade.86 Hence, the sovereign 
compulsion defense requires a broad "reasonableness inquiry" that 
focuses upon principles of international law and traditional equity 
rather than on the restraint of trade alone. A sound approach must 
allow the court the flexibility required in order adequately to re-
view several important factors that may influence the unique sover-
eign compulsion setting. 
One major factor that must be considered by a court using this 
balancing approach is the kind of impact the compelled activity may 
have upon American foreign policy. This question attains impor-
tance because a case involving foreign governmental action may 
§ 40. Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction. 
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the 
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, 
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating 
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as 
(a) vital national interests of each of the states, 
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement 
actions would impose upon the person, 
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of 
the other state, 
(d) the nationality of the person, and 
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be 
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state. 
R.Esl'A.TEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 40 (1965). 
86. The rule-of-reason inquiry was initially adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911), in which the Court ruled that 
only unreasonable or undue restraints of trade were meant to be included in the 
Sherman Act. 
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easily entail ramifications in the area of foreign relations and upset 
the desire for international comity. It may be argued that determi-
nations of this nature are not appropriately made in a judicial forum. 
However, the policy considerations involved in applying the defense 
of sovereign compulsion parallel problems found in the application 
of the doctrines of sovereign immunitys7 and act of state.as In apply-
ing each of these doctrines, courts are called upon to consider the pos-
sible impact of an activity or circumstance upon American foreign re-
lations. In such situations, the courts have traditionally deferred to 
any pronouncements made by the executive branch of government 
that serve to define the position of American foreign policy.so 
Absent any such definitive statement by the executive branch, 
however, the courts have considered themselves free to make their 
own determinations whether a defendant's conduct represents a 
serious breach of the nation's foreign policy.90 The advantage of 
a court being able to weigh these foreign-policy ramifications was 
exemplified by the somewhat emotive hypothetical case raised 
above91 concerning an order by an Arab nation instructing Ameri-
can businesses operating within its territory to discontinue sales to 
firms with Israeli or Jewish backing. Considerations of public policy 
in this case could be weighed by a court adopting a balancing ap-
proach but would probably be irrelevant under the Interamerican 
approach, which inquires only whether foreign governmental com-
pulsion actually existed. 
A second factor that a court should consider when ruling on a 
sovereign compulsion plea is the scope of the foreign government's 
directive. In the Interamerican case, Chief Judge Wright allowed 
Amoco to claim the defense and thereby immunized its refusal to 
deal even though it was not actually doing business in Venezuela.92 
87. See, e.g., Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) (involving the libeling by an 
American of a ship owned by Mexico); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (involving 
the libeling by a Cuban corporation of a ship owned by Peru). See also note 54 supra. 
88. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (involving 
the expropriation by Fidel Castro's Cuban Government of property owned by Ameri-
can citizens). See also notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text. 
89. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420, 436 (1964) 
(implying that the Court would continue to defer to the executive branch's expressed 
will in order to avoid possible inconsistent results and embarrassment to the executive 
branch in its conduct of foreign affairs); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) 
("It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has 
seen fit to allow •.•• "). 
90. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964) (deter· 
mining the applicability of the act-of-state doctrine when the State Department had 
failed to issue any definitive suggestion); Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General, 
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (in absence of suggestion 
of sovereign immunity by State Department, independently determining under State 
Department principles whether or not such immunity should apply). 
91. See text preceding note 62 supra. 
92. See note 12 supra· and accompanying text. For a discussion of the scope of 
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The court apparently was not concerned that extending the sover-
eign compulsion defense to activities carried on outside of the 
territory of the directing foreign government enables such a govern-
ment to interfere unnecessarily with the regulation of American 
business and commerce. Under the Interamerican rationale, for ex-
ample, a court would be powerless to attach liability to American 
tobacco buyers, who purchase some tobacco in Turkey, for refusing 
to deal with United States sources pursuant to a directive by the 
government of Turkey. While such immunity may be desirable 
under some circumstances, it unduly restricts the effectiveness of the 
antitrust laws to require a court automatically to grant immunity for 
all anticompetitive activities, regardless of their locus, merely be-
cause they were ordered by foreign sovereigns. 
A third factor that should be considered in determining whether 
the sovereign compulsion defense should be allowed is the degree of 
the compulsion. There are two facets of the degree question: how 
much of the defendant's conduct was actually compelled and what 
sanctions would have been imposed by the foreign sovereign for 
noncompliance. Immunity under the sovereign compulsion defense 
should not extend to acts merely requested or advised93 or to acts that 
go beyond those actually compelled by the foreign government.94 
Similarly, immunity should not be available if the consequences of 
violating the foreign sovereign's directive are minor. On the other 
hand, if compliance is required in order for the defendant to con-
tinue doing business in the foreign country, the equities for allow-
ing the sovereign compulsion defense are much stronger. 
The impact of the defendant's compelled activity upon Ameri-
can economic policy is a fourth factor that a court should consider. A 
foreign government may easily have economic policies and purposes 
that are inconsistent with the policies of the United States. An 
example of this inconsistency can be found in the Interamerican case, 
in which the court observed that Venezuela's purpose behind its 
directives may have been to cartelize the international market in 
governmental directives under the Interamerican approach, see notes 63-67 supra 
and accompanying text. 
93. The Supreme Court has previously disallowed immunity for acts merely per-
mitted by foreign law or government but not actually compelled. See, e.g., Continental 
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide 8c Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962) (discussed in 
text accompanying notes 24-27 supra); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 
341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
94. The Supreme Court has refused to grant immunity for acts that go beyond 
those actually compelled by the foreign government. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal 
Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Informa-
tion Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (discussed in notes 28-32 
supra and accompanying text). Cf. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 735 
(1952) (discussed in text accompanying notes 69-71 supra). 
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crude oil.95 To confer automatic immunity upon a defendant who is 
complying with a foreign sovereign's directive that has a purpose 
adverse to American economic policy would be to give such foreign 
governments a potentially powerful tool for undermining, or at least 
interfering with, American policy. 
A fifth factor is the quantitative and qualitative impact of the 
defendant's conduct upon competition and commerce. A study of this 
factor would consider, among other things, the nature of the 
market in which the restraint on trade occurred, the nature of the 
parties involved, and the nature of the offense itself. A restraint 
occurring in a highly concentrated industry, such as the automotive 
industry, is more difficult to accept than a restraint in a more com~ 
petitive industry, such as fishing.96 Similarly, it is easier to accept the 
settled consequences of a refusal to deal than the uncertain and 
prospective consequences of a continued vertical or horizontal system 
of price maintenance.97 The weight attached to this factor would 
vary according to degree: the greater the damage to free competition, 
the less reason to allow the defense of sovereign compulsion. 
A six.th factor deserving of some weight is the nationality of the 
defendant. American courts have traditionally refused to recognize 
any rights in foreign nationals to different treatment under the 
Sherman Act.98 However, when weighing the equities of allowing a 
sovereign compulsion defense, a court might consider the fact that 
the defendant is a foreign national whose acts were compelled by its 
95. See text accompanying note 62 supra. 
96. Thus, the more competitive the market in which the restraint occurs, the 
more likely that a court would allow the defense of sovereign compulsion. Such an 
approach is consistent with the recent judicial tendency disfavoring oligopolistic firms. 
See Bradley, Oligopoly Power under the Sherman and Clayton Acts: From Economic 
Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285 (1967). In a broad range of cases, the 
courts have indicated that various types of activity will violate the antitrust laws when 
carried out by an oligopolist while the same activity will not be illegal when carried 
out by a "true competitor." See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 
393 U.S. 333 (1969) (exchange of price information among competitors); United States 
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (horizontal merger); FTC v. Consolidated 
Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (conglomerate merger); United States v. Penn-Olin 
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint venture); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 
(1964) (retail price maintenance through consignment agreements). 
97. A vertical price maintenance system occurs when the parties in a seller-
purchaser relationship agree on sale and/or resale prices. See, e.g., United States v. 
Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). A horizontal price maintenance system is 
created when parties of the same economic function, such as two wholesalers or two 
retailers who are usually, but not necessarily, competitors, agree upon sale prices. 
See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59 (1940). 
However, even certain types of systems of horizontal price maintenance differ in their 
impact upon competitive forces. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 
U.S. 333 (1969). 
98. See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 
1963 Trade Cas. 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (discussed in notes 28-32 supra and accom-
panying text), in which the court refused to treat the Swiss nationals any differently 
than the American nationals when applying the Sherman Act. 
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own government. The justifications for requiring conduct abroad 
by foreign nationals to comply with American antitrust law in 
sovereign compulsion situations are not nearly as compelling as when 
the defendants are American nationals.99 
Furthermore, in keeping with the equitable nature of the balanc-
ing approach, a court should consider as a seventh factor the 
defendant's prior knowledge of the restraint. Granting immu-
nity would seem somewhat justified if the defendant had begun 
doing business in the foreign country before the activities com-
plained of were compelled by that country's sovereign. Conversely, a 
court should have less patience with a defendant who initiated ac-
tivities in a foreign country knowing that he would be required by 
that country's government to engage in acts violative of American 
antitrust laws. 
It is submitted that factors such as the seven discussed above 
should be considered by a court in determining whether to apply 
the doctrine of sovereign compulsion. The weight that a court 
might actually accord such factors would, of course, depend upon the 
particular fact situation involved in each case. However, balancing 
determinations entail considerable uncertainty and cannot provide 
much predictability; when a business is confronted with the harsh 
choice of discontinuing business in a foreign country or facing a 
crippling treble-damage action in the United States, such unpre-
dictability is undesirable. Accordingly, if the sovereign compulsion 
defense is to offer meaningful protection to Americans doing busi-
ness abroad, a strong presumption in favor of allowing the defense 
should attach once a showing of actual compulsion has been made. 
Under such a presumption, a strong showing of other factors would 
be necessary in order to defeat the defense. 
Such a presumption would afford ample protection for American 
businesses abroad. Were the courts willing to adopt such a presump-
tion, businessmen would only infrequently be required to terminate 
their foreign investments in circumstances involving sovereign com-
pulsion. Although this presumption clearly would not remove all 
uncertainty from the minds of Americans doing business abroad, it 
should be of substantial value in affording them guidelines to follow 
in their decision-making. 
Establishing a presumption in favor of allowing the defense of 
sovereign compulsion would also aid American courts in their 
efforts to maintain international comity. It has long been a basic 
policy of the federal courts that the judicial power of the United 
States should not be asserted "over affairs in the domain of others 
99. For a brief discussion of the desirability of allowing flexibility in the applica-
tion of American antitrust laws to foreign nationals, see J. Rahl, supra note 30, at 
357-59. 
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unless there is demonstrable national interest sought to be protected 
or public harm sought to be prevented."100 The proposed approach 
would further the policy objectives of fairness to businesses abroad 
and of international comity, yet would be flexible enough that it 
would not unduly frustrate American antitrust policy. 
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE 
PROPOSED BALANCING APPROACH 
It is not suggested that the practical application of the proposed 
balancing approach would always be easy or that the outcome of 
the determination would invariably be predictable. However, the 
balancing approach would at least give a court considerable flexi-
bility in determining the equities of a particular case-flexibility 
that is not available under the limited approach adopted by the 
court in the Interamerican case. Moreover, the consideration of 
these factors should be no more difficult for a court than the similar 
balancing that it is required to undertake in most equity cases. 
The operation of the proposed approach may best be understood 
by applying it to two factual situations. In the Continental Ore 
case,101 Electro Met, a subsidiary of Union Carbide, had been ap-
pointed the exclusive purchasing agent of vanadium for the Cana-
dian Government. Continental Ore alleged that Electro Met had 
conspired with its parent so that the advantages obtained from 
possession of the exclusive franchise might be used to monopolize 
vanadium production and sales in Canada. The Supreme Court 
refused to immunize Electro Met from liability simply because in 
its agency capacity it was acting in a manner "permitted by Canadian 
Law."102 A different question would have arisen had the Canadian 
Government ordered Electro Met to deal solely with Union Carbide. 
The answer of the district court that decided the lnteramerican 
case would be evident: once the defendant had proved the fact of 
compulsion, the defense of sovereign compulsion would have exon-
erated him from liability. The disquieting policy implications of 
this arbitrary approach have already been discussed.103 
Under the suggested approach, once Electro Met had proved the 
fact of compulsion, a presumption would arise that it was entitled 
to claim the defense of sovereign compulsion. The burden would 
then fall on the plaintiff to bring to the court's attention circum-
stances that justified disallowing the defense. One of the first things 
100. Brewster, Extraterritorial Effects of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: "An Appraisal," 
11 ABA .ANTITRUST SECTION PROC. 65, 70 (1957). See notes 37-54 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
101. 370 U.S. 690 (1962). See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra. 
102. 370 U.S. at 707. 
103. See pt. II. supra. 
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the court might properly consider would be the impact of the alleg-
edly illegal activity upon the foreign policy and national interests of 
the United States. If the executive branch did not submit to the court 
a statement indicating whether it felt that the concerted agree-
ment between Electro Met and Union Carbide adversely affected 
national interests, the court might examine the motivating factors 
behind the Canadian Government's order. In this case, the purpose 
seems to have been to insure an adequate supply of vanadium to 
support Canadian defense preparedness.104 Since Canada maintains 
a close military alliance with the United States, it can be assumed 
that improvement in the Canadian defense posture is not adverse to 
American interests. An inevitable consequence of the Canadian gov-
ernment's order, however, would be a dilution of the vigor of free 
competition in the vanadium market. The domestic and foreign 
commerce of the United States undoubtedly would be sufficiently 
affected to enable the courts of the United States to assert jurisdiction 
over the activities involved.105 However, effects on commerce more 
substantial than those necessary to confer jurisdiction should be re-
quired in order to defeat a claim of sovereign compulsion.106 In 
this case, it seems that in any real quantitative sense, the American 
economy would not have been materially affected. It should be 
further noted that all of the overt activities carried on took place 
within the territorial limits of Canada;107 there was no attempt to use 
Canada as a refuge for far-reaching illegal actions. 
At least two other factors would remain for the court to con-
sider, but they cannot be evaluated in this discussion because the re-
port of the decision provided insufficient information. The court 
should determine the nature of the compulsion applied by the 
Canadian Government and the possible consequences faced by Elec-
tro Met should it refuse to comply with the order. The court should 
also balance the potential consequences to the defendant resulting 
from noncompliance with the actual injury sustained by the plaintiff. 
Subject to the outcome of these two determinations, it appears from 
the information available that a court confronted with the facts here 
under discussion would strike the over-all balance in the defendant's 
favor and grant a motion to allow the defense of sovereign compul-
sion. 
The foregoing method of analysis also could be applied in the 
Interamerican case. The court would begin with a presumption in 
the defendant's favor, since adequate proof was presented demon-
104. See 370 U.S. at 702 n.11. 
105. See notes I & 3 supra. 
106. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text. 
107. Although all overt acts were carried out within Canada, part of the alleged 
conspiracy was planned in the United States. 370 U.S. at 706. 
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strating the existence of actual compulsion.108 While the executive 
branch of the United States Government did not submit a statement 
in Interamerican commenting upon the nature of the national inter-
ests involved, it appears that the purpose of the Venezuelan Govern-
ment was in part to cartelize the international market for crude oil.100 
Thus, the court could properly conclude that the purpose of the 
Venezuelan order was contrary to American economic goals. 
On the other hand, although the impact on the plaintiff of the 
defendants' compliance was disastrous, the impact upon over-all 
competition in the field did not extend beyond the plaintiff, and 
hence was not great. An additional factor operating in favor of the 
defense's application was the fact that the activities of Monven and 
Supven resulting from the compulsion to refuse to sell crude oil 
either directly or indirectly to the plaintiff were territorially confined 
to Venezuela. Hence, the equities weighing against these defen-
dants' case appear to be insufficient to overcome the strong presump-
tion invoked in order to provide adequate protection for American 
business abroad and to prevent unnecessary strains upon interna-
tional comity. Since the balance of relevant considerations remains 
in these defendants' favor, the sovereign compulsion defense should 
be allowed. 
The situation is different, however, with respect to Amoco. 
Amoco was an international trading company whose only contacts 
with Venezuela constituted purchasing crude oil from Venezuelan 
producers and shipping it to refinery buyers. By its agreement with 
Monven and Supven, it extended the scope of the Venezuelan Gov-
ernment's orders to activities outside Venezuelan territory. While a 
definite conclusion cannot be reached concerning the issue of 
Amoco's liability because of the insufficient amount of information 
available, this factor should weigh against allowing Amoco to use 
the shield of sovereign compulsion. Further relevant questions might 
include determinations whether any sources of Venezuelan crude oil 
were open to Amoco for shipment to the plaintiff aside from 
Monven and Supven and whether Amoco attempted to find alterna-
tive sources of crude oil in the Middle East for Interamerican.110 
V. SUMMARY 
In an era of increasing concern by governments with the trade 
and economic policies of their nations, economic conflicts between 
countries may be expected to continue to arise; and along with this 
108. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text. 
109. See text accompanying note 62 supra. 
110. In Interamerican Amoco alleged it had tried and failed to secure alternative 
sources of oil. See Joint Reply Brief on Behalf of Defendants at 18, Interamerican Ref. 
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 ·(D. Del. 1970). 
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rise in conflicts an increasing frequency in instances of sovereign
compulsion situations may be expected. As this occurs, American
courts should not refrain from recognizing the validity of the
sovereign compulsion defense, nor should they shy away from apply-
ing it when needed. But in applying it, the courts should not adopt a
wooden and inflexible approach. The twin policies of intergovern-
mental comity and fairness are not unobtainable or mutually ex-
clusive. A court may well maximize the pursuit of these goals and
safeguard essential national interests as well if it approaches the
sovereign compulsion situation in a spirit of flexibility-seeking to
obtain maximum latitude in order to enable it to review all of the
important considerations with which it is then confronted.
Notes
